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Abstract
The many sensors embedded in phones nowadays provide advanced sensing capabilities that make it possible to capture
real-time information about the user and his surroundings. There are already examples of apps that use this information
to provide highly useful and contextual services to the users. However, users are still reluctant to share their personal
data with service providers due to their privacy implications (if misused).
In this work, we provide protocols that allow users to store their sensor data on third party (untrusted) cloud servers.
The data is stored in encrypted form (so protected from the cloud providers) with access only to service providers ex-
plicitly pre-approved by the users. The protocols simultaneously also ensure that the data accessed by service providers
is in fact ‘current’ and consistent. This is achieved by integrating transactional and cryptographic primitives, such
as atomic uploads, optimistic concurrency control, proxy re-encryption and homomorphic encryption, among others.
Finally, experimental results are given to illustrate the practical feasibility and scalability of the proposed protocols.
c© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer]
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1. Introduction
Apps/Services are the lifeline of today’s smartphones. Their immense popularity is evident from the
thousands of apps available in Nokia’s Ovi Store, Apple’s AppStore, Google’s Android Marketplace, Win-
dows Marketplace Hub, etc. The reason apps are so popular and useful is because they provide services
customized to the user. This customization is performed based on information monitored by the many
hardware and logical sensors present in the phone.
However, we argue that the true potential of the apps ecosystem is yet to be realized. The ideal apps
should provide services that are real-time and context based, almost as a human companion who has access
to profile, historical and current information about the user. The main limitation here is not in the ability
to collect suﬃcient information about the user (as the phone sensors nowadays are sophisticated enough to
detect almost every activity carried out by the user and also those happening in the surrounding environ-
ment), or in the capability of data mining research to reconstruct high level activities from the low level
information collected by the sensors. The main issue is in the reluctance of users to share their personal
URL: debmalya.biswas@nokia.com (Debmalya Biswas), vidya@mun.ca (Krishnamurthy Vidyasankar)
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
570   Debmalya Biswas and Krishnamurthy Vidyasankar /  Procedia Computer Science  10 ( 2012 )  569 – 576 
information (possibly collected by the sensors) with third party service providers, given the grave privacy
implications if such personal information falls in the wrong hands.
To summarize, our motivational scenario has the following requirements:
• From a privacy perspective, personal data should always remain in the user’s control, the user decides
what to share and with whom. This aspect is also highlighted in recent EU and US FTC Privacy
regulations1/rulings2 where a more explicit ‘opt-in’ is required before processing user personal infor-
mation than the earlier practice of ‘implied consent with option to opt-out’.
• From the service providers point of view, it needs access to real-time information about the user.
Such information should not only be ‘current’ but also consistent. Often user context information
is derived by combining multiple sensors’ data belonging to the user. So, it should not happen that
for the same user, an advertiser receives readings of two sensors s1 and s2 recorded at diﬀerent time
intervals τ1  τ2 respectively.
• Finally, there is a need for an external storage provider. Even with ever increasing storage capabilities,
it is not possible to store all user information, esp. historical information on the phone itself. So there
is a need for an external (possibly cloud based) storage where user data can be stored temporarily
before it is accessed by the service providers. Such a server may be provided by third party providers
as well, and hence cannot be considered trusted (any data stored there would need to be protected).
To address the above requirements, we propose an eﬃcient data-sharing architecture in this work pro-
viding the following main features:
• automated collection, upload and storage of personal data;
• user control over stored data;
• real-time and consistent data access for service providers (advertisers);
• secure storage on third party untrusted cloud servers;
The architecture is illustrated in Fig. 1. The protocols work by integrating fundamental transactional
and cryptographic primitives such as
• atomic uploads and concurrent access to evolving data;
• proxy re-encryption and homomorphic encryption.
For a more detailed description of the above primitives, the interested reader is referred to Section 2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 outlines the proposed schema to store user sensor
data (generated by their mobile phones). The main contribution of the paper, i.e. the privacy preserving
profiling protocols are given in Section 4. Section 5 provides experimental results including our prototype
implementation details. Section 6 discusses related works with Section 7 finally concluding the paper.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Transactions
Transactions [1] allow grouping a sequence of operations within Begin and Commit/Abort operations
with ACID (Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, Durability) properties.
1EU art. 29 Working Party Opinion WP 187. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp187 en.pdf
2http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/11/privacysettlement.shtm
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Fig. 1. System architecture
• Atomicity: ensures that all data operations in a transaction are either performed in their entirety or
none at all. In the event of a failure during execution, the transaction is aborted leading to rollback of
all uncommitted changes (if any).
• Isolation: To improve performance, often several transactions are executed concurrently. Isolation
necessitates that the eﬀects of such concurrent execution are equivalent to that of a serial execution [2].
This property is provided by the concurrency control protocols.
• Consistency: Each transaction moves the system from one consistent state to another. Atomicity and
isolation together ensure consistency.
• Durability: The eﬀects of the committed transactions should survive any system failures.
We focus on the A, C and I properties here. Durability is assumed to be guaranteed by the storage
medium. In a distributed setting, with a transaction processing data belonging to diﬀerent clients, there
might be a need to get feedback from multiple clients before the transaction can be committed. This is
achieved using distributed commit protocols, such as the commercially available 2 Phase Commit (2PC)
protocol, or more advanced ones such as [3].
2.2. Cryptographic Primitives
Proxy re-encryption [4] allows a ciphertext for A to be re-encrypted into a ciphertext for B (can be
decrypted using B’s secret key). The envisioned application of such an encryption scheme is delegation, e.g.
an employee can delegate his confidential encrypted emails to his secretary, without any need to forward his
secret key. We specify a proxy re-encryption scheme PRE(KGEN, ENC, PRK,RENC,DEC) formally as
follows:
• KGEN(1k) outputs a public-private key pair: (Apb, Apr).
• ENC(Apb,m) outputs cA1, the message m encrypted under public key Apb.
• PRK(Apr, Bpb) outputs a re-encryption key rkA→B that allows ciphertexts generated using A’s public
key to be decrypted by B’s private key.
• RENC(rkA→B, cA1) outputs the ciphertext cB2 generated by re-encrypting cA1 under rkA→B.
• DEC(Bpr, cB2) decrypts cB2 using Bpr, returning the message m.
A construction based on bilinear maps of the above scheme is given in [5].
Homomorphic encryption [6] schemes allow arithmetic operations to be performed locally on the plain-
text values, based on their encrypted values (ciphertext). A homomorphic encryption scheme HE = (ENCH ,DECH)
satisfies the following property for two positive integers a and b:
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DECH(ENCH(a) × ENCH(b)) = a + b
The homomorphic encryption scheme is public-key, i.e. any party can perform the encryption operation
ENC() (by itself). A construction of such a scheme is given in [6].
3. Storage Model
Smartphones nowadays consist of an ever increasing number of embedded sensors that while not meant
specifically for sensing, can actually be used to capture very contextual and real-time information about the
user. In addition to the more commonly known input devices such as camera, microphone, bluetooth, etc.,
an average smartphone also contains many of the following sensors: Global Positioning System (GPS), Ac-
celerometer, Ambient Light, Compass, Magnetometer, Orientation, Proximity, Rotation. The above sensors
can be used to infer a host of information about the user and his surrounding, e.g.
• GPS is the classic location sensor allowing the user’s location to be tracked in real-time with a very
high level of precision.
• The accelerometer can be used to infer the user’s activity, e.g. if he is walking/running or how fast is
he moving his hand, in which direction, etc.
• Bluetooth signals can be used to determine nearby friends (known social acquaintances).
• Even traditional input devices such as the camera and microphone can be used to determine informa-
tion about the user’s surroundings, e.g. if the user is in a party, close to a known attraction.
An exhaustive study of the functionality of each sensor and the types of sensing modalities they allow
are beyond the scope of this paper. We refer the reader to [7] for a survey of some interesting smartphone
apps made possible by the sensing capabilities of the phones.
We consider the following database schema to store user data collected by the various sensors:
• Sensor tables: We assume a table corresponding to each sensor s. By abuse of notation, we use s
to refer to both the sensor s and the table corresponding to it. In addition to columns to store the
sensor property values, each table s also has the following additional columns: (i) Timestamp: the
time when the sensors readings were recorded. (ii) User ID: refers to the corresponding user Ui.
(iii) Sensor property values: E.g. Accelerometer properties include the accelerometer readings or
acceleration along x, y and z axes.
• Profiles: is used to store the participating users’ profiles.
Both types of tables have UserID as the primary key.
To simplify the discussion, we only consider the select and update data manipulation operations (in-
sert/delete can be accommodated as special types of update operations):
• update(s j,Ui, c j) with the semantics that the Ui row of sensor table s j table with key Ui is updated to
row value c j.
• select(s j,Ui) returns the corresponding row value c j.
4. Privacy Preserving Real-time Profiling
4.1. Delegated Control
In this section, we give the protocol that allows user personal data to be stored securely on (untrusted)
third party cloud servers, with access only to specific advertisers explicitly approved by the users. Access
rights need to be specified once per advertiser (and not for each access) by the user, with the storage provider
applying it for each access (hence “delegated”). Consistency of uploaded and accessed data by users and
advertisers respectively is provided as transactional guarantees.
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1. Initial setup: Each user Ui and advertiser Ai runs KGEN(1k) to generate its public-private key pair:
(Uipb ,Uipr ) and (Aipb , Aipr ) respectively. Each user Ui also generates a re-encryption key rkUi→Ak =
PRK(Uipr , Akpb) for each advertiser Ak allowed to access its data, and sends them to the server S .
2. User Ui encrypts and then uploads its sensor data to S as the transaction ti ::= {update(s j,Ui, c j)| j =
1 · · ·n} where c j = ENC(Uipb , v j)
(The actual process of recording sensor data is described later in Section 5.1). On receiving the
transaction ti, S performs conflict detection (the conflict detection logic is given later in Step 4).
For now, we assume that the conflict detection was successful, leading to update of the Ui rows in
si, · · · , sn tables and commit of ti.
3. Advertiser Ak requests user Ui’s data from S as the transaction tk ::= {select(s j,Ui)| j = 1 · · ·m}.
Given tk, S performs pre-emptive conflict detection by checking if for any of the requested s j tables,
there are still active ti transactions by Ui.
• If yes, abort tk (implies user context is being updated, so any data read now would anyway be
outdated).
• If not, S re-encrypts the corresponding c j values and returns them to Ak:
{a j = RENC(rkUi→Ak , c j)| j = 1 · · ·m}.
Ak decrypts the received a j values:
{v j = DEC(Akpr , a j)| j = 1 · · ·m}
Ak then processes Ui’s data, before finally committing tk by a simple notification to S .
4. Conflict detection for user Ui’s transaction ti: S checks if for any of the s j tables to be updated, there
are active tk transactions of Ak with respect to the row containing Ui. If a conflict exists, abort tk.
Irrespective of whether a conflict existed or not, ti can now commit as already outlined in Step 2.
The protocol satisfies our main use-case requirements as follows:
• User control over his personal data: Only advertisers for whom re-encryption keys have been explic-
itly given by the user to the server, can access his data. The user Ui can revoke access for advertiser
Ak at any time by removing his re-encryption key rkUi→Ak from S .
• Real-time and consistent data for the advertisers: If data used by the advertisers for computing their
recommendations becomes outdated (is updated by the user in between), then the advertiser is notified
accordingly. This combined with completeness of uploaded user data (atomicity) ensures that the data
received by advertisers gives a consistent view of the user’s contextual state.
• Protect data from untrusted cloud storage provider: The third party storage provider lacks keys re-
quired to decrypt both the user encrypted (c j) and re-encrypted (a j) values. Note that collusion be-
tween the server and advertisers is not considered here (to be taken up in future work).
4.2. Collaborative Filtering and Complete User Control
In this section, we consider highly sensitive personal data for which access cannot be delegated, but
needs to be requested explicitly from the user for each access by the advertisers. A related scenario may
be that of more ad-hoc access where the users whose data will be required keeps evolving with time (and
cannot be pre-determined initially).
We also extend the previous scenario by allowing collaborative filtering, where data of multiple users
is needed by the advertisers to compute their recommendations. So requests for permission need to be sent
to multiple users, and only if they all agree is the advertiser allowed to aggregate their data for advertising
purposes. To further protect users from abuse, we also require that the user decisions remain confidential
from the advertisers, i.e. the specific users who allowed (or did not allow) use of their data as requested by
the advertiser should not be revealed to the server/advertiser.
1. Initial setup: Each user Ui and advertiser Ai runs KGEN(1k) to generate its public-private key pair:
(Uipb ,Uipr ) and (Aipb , Aipr ) respectively.
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2. Atomic upload: User Ui first encrypts and then uploads its sensor data to S as the transaction ti ::=
{update(s j,Ui, c j)| j = 1 · · ·n} where c j = ENC(Uipb , v j).
(The actual process of recording sensor data is described later in Section 5.1). On receiving the
transaction ti, S performs conflict detection (the conflict detection logic is given later in Step 4).
For now, we assume that the conflict detection was successful, leading to update of the Ui rows in
si, · · · , sn tables and commit of ti.
3. Advertiser Ak requests user Ui=1···ps’ data from S as the transaction tk ::= {select(s j,Ui)|i = 1 · · · p, j =
1 · · ·m}. Given tk, S performs pre-emptive conflict detection by checking if for any of the requested
s j tables, there are still active ti transactions by Ui.
• If yes, abort tk.
• If not, to each user Ui, send the timestamp of its values in the sensor tables and a request for
permission with respect to access by advertiser Ak.
(a) If Ui decides to allow this access request, then it returns two pieces of information to S :
(di = ENCH(0), rkUi→Ak ) to S. Otherwise, it returns di = ENCH(1) to S .
(b) S on receiving the encrypted decision values di from all users Ui=1···p, computes d =
DECH(d1 × · · · × dp). If d > 0, abort tk; else S re-encrypts the corresponding c j values
and returns them to Ak: {ai j = RENC(rkUi→Ak , c j)|i = 1 · · · p, j = 1 · · ·m}.
(c) Ak decrypts the received ai j values: {vi j = DEC(Akpr , ai j)|i = 1 · · · p, j = 1 · · ·m} and
processes Ui’s data, before finally committing tk by a simple notification to S .
4. Conflict detection for user Ui’s transaction ti is analogous to the one outlined earlier.
Security: The use of homomorphic encryption in Step 3 ensures that only the combined decision (of all
involved users) becomes known to S , and not the individual replies by each user.
Concurrency Control Protocol: Multi-version. Row level (and not table level) conflict detection is consid-
ered in the above protocols improving scalability. The concurrency control protocol is also tailored for our
use-case with priority given to user transactions uploading sensor data, i.e. they are never aborted even if
a conflict is detected (the only reason for their abort is if there is some problem in the uploading process
itself). A simple way of avoiding aborts of the ‘select’ transactions is to have two versions of each user’s
data. (Note that they are timestamped.) Then, an update transaction creates a new version, any subsequent
selects are directed to the newer version, and when the current select transactions finish reading the old
version, the old version can be deleted.
5. Experimental Evaluation
5.1. Data Collection Module
To collect sensor data, we have a Data Collection Module (DCM) running on the phones constantly
monitoring sensor accesses. The DCM has been implemented based on the Qt3 framework running on the
Nokia N9/N900 phones.
Qt provides a platform neutral API framework for apps to interact with the phone. The Qt API frame-
work is categorized into modules to perform diﬀerent tasks on the phone. The DCM uses the QtSensors
classes to read the phone sensor values and stores them in a SQLite database in encrypted form on the phone
(having schema as described in Section 3).
3http://doc.qt.nokia.com/
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Fig. 2. Encryption overhead
5.2. Encryption Overhead
To simulate the motivational scenario, we have implemented the protocol presented in Section 4.2. From
the user’s (N900 phone) side, there is a daemon running on the phone that executes ‘upload’ transactions,
uploading the (encrypted) data stored in the local SQLite database to a remote server hosted in the Nokia
internal cloud computing environment. On the same lines, we have threads running on Ubuntu (Linux)
requesting access to the user data as ‘select’ transactions, simulating advertisers.
Overall, we have 2 users and 2 advertisers in our experimental setup. Transaction workload is simulated
by executing the upload/select transactions after random delays. To negate the eﬀect of random delays in the
experimental results, we have presented results taken as an average of 5 runs. We actually did not observe a
lot of variation among the readings for the diﬀerent runs.
Fig. 2 gives the encryption overhead of ‘Symmetric+Homomorphic’ primitives as the increase in overall
execution time (in comparison to executing the same with ‘No encryption’). Currently, the only known open
source proxy re-encryption implementation 4 is in C++, and as our implementation is in Java; the Java-C++
interfacing was distorting our performance results. So symmetric encryption (DESede algorithm) instead of
proxy re-encryption is currently used in our implementation. Homomorphic encryption is provided by the
open source Java implementation thep 5.
Homomorphic encryption does seem to have a noticeable impact on the performance, however this
increase is still linear with respect to the number of transactions, i.e. 2099secs for 1000 transactions to
2099 × 5 ≈ 10495secs for 5000 transactions. This shows the scalability of the proposed protocols.
5.3. Abort Rate
The other interesting aspect to study here is the abort rate. (Recall that the abort rate mainly aﬀects
advertisers as priority is given to user upload transactions in our concurrency control protocols.)
To get a more realistic estimate, we use the real-life data collected by Lausanne Data Collection Cam-
paign (LDCC) 6. LDCC was a year long campaign to collect user contextual data (of almost 180 users) as
recorded by their mobile phones. We basically use the update rate of user location data in LDCC to simu-
late our user update transactions. The advertiser select transactions are still generated randomly. We found
that in such a simulated environment, the abort rate can be as high as 50%. The result can be interpreted
in two ways: (i) For real-time services, this implies that our protocols would have helped the providers in
50% cases by preventing them from recommending services based on outdated data. (ii) On the other hand,
for oﬄine profilers (not so time-critical), this implies that a multi-version concurrency control protocol (as
outlined in Section 4.2) can be used to optimize execution.
4http://spar.isi.jhu.edu/prl/
5http://code.google.com/p/thep/
6http://research.nokia.com/page/11367
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6. Related Works
Transactions [1] have a long established history of providing reliable and concurrent access to distributed
data storage systems. Many works have considered transactions in web services [3, 8] and cloud computing
environments [9]. However, providing transactions on encrypted data (as is a growing requirement with
more and more data stored on untrusted cloud servers) is a novel aspect of this work.
The closest and only known work (to the best of our knowledge) related to “transactions on encrypted
data” is [10]. However [10] considers a diﬀerent use-case scenario where data is replicated (cached) among
multiple clients, and the cloud server is only responsible for providing transactional guarantees based on
stored transaction logs. The main diﬀerence is in the capabilities/functionalities of the diﬀerent clients.
While in [10], clients act as peers with all clients having access to the same data; we have certain clients
who generate data and are the data owners (mobile users), and some who only access data (advertisers).
From a general database perspective, our use-case can be considered as a simplification of the scenario
where all clients can both read/update data. At the same time however, this leads to data access challenges
which are overcome by integrating the encryption primitives.
From a privacy perspective, previous works [5, 11] have considered privacy preserving approaches to
outsource consumer data to third party providers. However [5, 11] mainly focus on searching over encrypted
data, while providing reliability and consistency of data is equally important for our use-case.
7. Conclusion
In this work, we provided an eﬃcient architecture to share user context data (as recorded by their mobile
phone sensors) with service providers (advertisers) that (i) allows the user to remain in control of their shared
data, while (ii) giving real-time and consistent data access to the advertisers. One of the main highlights of
the proposed architecture is that it allows both control and storage to be outsourced to (possibly untrusted)
third party cloud based storage providers.
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